




I. Bennett Capers 
 
In July 2017, the New York Times reported that Three Square Market, a 
Wisconsin-based technology company, was asking its employees to have a 
microchip “the size of a grain of rice injected between their thumb and index 
finger.”1  Responding to privacy concerns raised by the media, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Three Square Market made clear that the chip is simply a reader like a 
swipe card.  With an implanted microchip, “any task involving RFID technology—
swiping into the office building, paying for food in the cafeteria—can be 
accomplished with a wave of the hand.”2  He added, “Your cellphone does 100 
times more reporting of data than does an RFID chip.”3  Apparently, these 
assurances were sufficient for Three Square Market’s employees, more than half of 
whom consented to the implant.4  As one employee put it, “In the next five to 10 
years, this is going to be something that isn’t scoffed at so much, or is more 
normal.  So I like to jump on the bandwagon with these kind of things early, just to 
say that I have it.”5 
This story piqued my interest for several reasons, not the least of them being a 
little bit of chagrin about the burgeoning number of swipe cards in my wallet, 
including one to enter the law school where I teach.  But mostly, as someone who 
has been thinking about criminal justice and new technologies, I was interested in 
what the implanting of microchips might portend for criminal justice issues.  We 
have long photographed and fingerprinted arrestees, allowing us to trace them in 
perpetuity.  And in Maryland v. King, with little hand-wringing, the Court ruled 
that allowing the government to also collect DNA was no different, and thus 
constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.6  Might we one day 
implant chips in convicted felons,7 or arrestees, under a similar rationale?  Or if not 
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all arrestees, perhaps those released on bail?  Indeed, at a time when many scholars 
and legislators are rethinking bail,8 might the availability of removable chips—
currently, the cost is about $300 per chip, and one can easily imagine the cost 
decreasing with mass production—strengthen the argument against pretrial 
detention? 
The speculation—like speculative fiction, which is also specular—does not 
stop here.  What are the implications for sentencing, especially algorithmic risk-
based sentencing?  Or perhaps a closer fit, what are the implications for releasing 
defendants who have completed their sentences and are eligible for parole?  At a 
time when the Court has given its blessing to civil commitment for sex offenders,9 
and when sex offender registries have become the new normal, how might the 
availability of microchips to monitor the coming and going of individuals—like a 
wireless fence—change the analysis?  Finally, and perhaps most central to this 
essay, what are the possibilities when we couple the availability of microchips with 
access to Big Data? 
I come to these questions not as someone who laments the loss of privacy.  
Like other contributors to this symposium, I am well aware of the warnings.  
Surveillance is “an insidious assault on our freedom.”10  It is “nearly impossible to 
live today without generating thousands of records about what we watch, read, 
buy, and do—and the government has easy access to them.”11  Big Brother is 
watching.  We should be afraid. 
While these concerns are not without merit, my scholarly interest in the 
intersection of criminal justice and technology is decidedly different.  What 
interests me is harnessing technology to de-bias and de-racialize policing.  As I 
have written previously, “the possibility that Big Brother will watch us does not 
have to be frightening.  The task is to reimagine Big Brother so that he not only 
watches us; he also watches over us—to reimagine Big Brother as protective, and 
as someone who will be there to tell our side of the story.”12 
In two companion articles, I have argued that technology, including access to 
Big Data, can provide something akin to “doctrinal assists,” where Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in particular has proven inadequate to making policing 
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more egalitarian and indeed has likely contributed to race-based policing.13  More 
broadly, I have focused on three aspects of policing that seem most intractable and 
in need of change.  These problems are police violence, under-enforcement, and 
racial profiling.  Since police violence against racial minorities, sometimes called 
“blue-on-black” violence,14 has become part of the national conversation with the 
ubiquity of cellphone footage of incidents and the work of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, I will not say much about that problem here.  Nor will I say much 
about racial profiling, which has also become a well-known issue and, recently, the 
focus of a successful class-action lawsuit, Floyd v. City of New York.15  I will say a 
few words about under-enforcement, because it often gets short shrift, or no shrift 
at all.  At the same time communities of color suffer from over-enforcement, they 
also suffer from its very opposite: under-enforcement.  Studies suggest that police 
are less likely to investigate and prosecute property or violent crimes in 
communities of color.16  Studies even show that police departments have slower 
response times to minority neighborhoods, even when minority neighborhoods and 
non-minority neighborhoods are equidistant.17  As Alexandra Natapoff has 
observed, all of this has the expressive effect of “send[ing] an official message of 
dismissal and devaluation.”18 
My interventions to date have involved exploring the ways technology can be 
harnessed to address these problems.  Specifically, I have argued that the increased 
use of public surveillance cameras and facial recognition technology, coupled with 
access to Big Data and perhaps terahertz scanners capable of distance scanning for 
firearms, could do much of the work of tackling the third problem I identified—
racialized policing.  Instead of “young + black + male = probable cause,”19 the use 
of these technologies could mean race-blind policing.  I wrote: 
 
Terahertz scanners would tell the police that the bulge in a black 
teenager’s jacket is nothing more than a bulky cellphone, but that white 
tourist who looks like he is from Texas really does have a gun.  Facial 
recognition technology combined with Big Data would tell the police 
that the brown driver repeatedly circling the block in fact works in the 
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neighborhood and is probably looking for a parking space and that the 
clean-cut white dude reading a paper on a park bench is in fact a sex 
offender who, just by being near a playground, is violating his sex 
offender registration.  It would tell the police that the black kid running 
down the street is simply that, a kid running down the street.  It would 
tell them, in a way that is less intrusive or embarrassing, whether 
someone is a troublemaker casing a neighborhood or a student returning 
home with a bag of Skittles and an iced tea; a loiterer up to no good, or a 
father waiting to pick up his children from school; a burglar about to 
commit a home invasion, or a Harvard professor entering his own home; 
a thug with a gun, or a police chief; a trespasser attempting to enter the 
Capitol Building, or a Republican senator; a mugger looking for his next 
victim, or the future United States Attorney General; a thief about to 
burgle a laboratory, or the world renowned astrophysicist Neil DeGrasse 
Tyson, guilty only of “JBB (just being black).”  And it would tell that the 
white kid from New Jersey driving into Harlem is not there to score 
drugs, but to see his black girlfriend.20 
 
The deployment of these technologies would not only likely reduce racialized 
policing, but they would also address the two other problems I identified—blue-
on-black violence and under-enforcement.  With respect to blue-on-black violence, 
the access to terahertz scanners, facial recognition technology, and Big Data could 
immediately provide officers with information regarding whether a suspect is 
unarmed, thus obviating the need for deadly force, or whether a suspect has a 
history of violence or resisting arrest, warranting extra precautions.21  It could also 
help with under-enforcement.  The fact that cadres of officers would no longer be 
needed to conduct what Tracey Meares accurately calls “stop-and-frisk as a 
practice”22 means that officers would now be free to actually investigate and solve 
                                                                                                                                      
20  Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, supra note 13, at 1277–78 (citations omitted). 
21  Indeed, mere access to the FBI’s national database would tell police, with a click of a 
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22  Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
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carried out by a police force en masse as a program.”). 
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crimes.  We should all be troubled by the fact that one-third of all murders in this 
country go unsolved.23 
This brings me to other interventions.  If the goal is making policing more 
transparent, accountable, and egalitarian,24 what technological innovations might 
further those goals?  Some years ago, Elizabeth Joh explored discretionless 
policing through the use of automatic traffic tickets based on dedicated short-range 
communications technology, which allows a host of information concerning a car’s 
speed, registration, and location to be communicated to a third-party.25  We now 
also have automated ticketing through red-light cameras.  In addition, there exists 
technology that would allow the police to stop a vehicle remotely using 
electromagnetic pulses.26  Recently, students even created a Virtual Ticketing App 
so that a police officer could remain in his vehicle during traffic stops.27  Might 
these technologies—when coupled with access to Big Data—lead to a reduction in 
pretextual stops, especially given the overwhelming evidence that such stops are 
laden with racial and class biases28 and may in fact increase crime?29  Here is 
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another question: are there technologies that can create smarter smart guns30 (i.e., 
firearms that will automatically disengage and require additional steps before they 
can be reengaged) for when officers confront individuals who, based on known 
information from Big Data, are unlikely to pose any serious threat? 
Or more ambitiously, returning to the discussion of microchips, how might 
the availability of microchips coupled with access to Big Data assist in de-
racializing and de-biasing policing?  At this point, more and more jurisdictions are 
requiring citizens to identify themselves if asked,31 and the Court has given its 
imprimatur to stop-and-identify statutes.32  Given this state of affairs, might there 
be advantages to a system in which we are all knowable from afar, and in which, to 
borrow from Andrew Ferguson, “unknown suspects can be known—not simply 
identified by name, but revealed through a web of facts involving criminal records, 
personal history, and past location data”?33  It certainly seems preferable to the 
current state of affairs, where “[s]kin color becomes evidence,”34 where too often 
“young + black + male = probable cause,”35 where there continues to be a “racial 
tax”36 at odds with our ambition of equality before the law at both gatehouses and 
mansions,37 and where “‘unequal public privacy’” is the norm, with those who are 
privileged by race and class enjoying a relative surfeit.38  And if inserted 
microchips seem too dystopian—too much like Clockwork Orange, if not 1984— 
could many of the same advantages be obtained with the microchips we already 
carry, albeit in smartphones? 
This is not to suggest that new technologies are risk-free.  There is the 
concern that technology may replicate and entrench existing inequalities; even the 
evidence about the current state of facial recognition technology is troubling.39  
                                                                                                                                      
30  Smart guns, which use technology to prevent anyone but the registered owner from using 
the gun, are already on the market.  See 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, POLICEONE (Aug. 3, 
2017), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearms/articles/391099006-5-things-to-know-
about-smart-guns/ [https://perma.cc/EK36-3BBE].  There is also technology that allows a firearm to 
be remotely disengaged.  See Martha Mendoza, With High-Tech Guns, Users Could Disable 
Remotely, WASH. TIMES (May 21, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/21/high-
tech-guns-users-could-disable-remotely/ [https://perma.cc/CL3U-WXM6]. 
31  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2921.29 (2006); IND. CODE § 34-28-5-3.5 (2016). 
32  Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004). 
33  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 327, 351 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
34  David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” 
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268 (1999). 
35  Gaynes, supra note 19. 
36  RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159 (1997). 
37  The reference is, of course, to Yale Kamisar’s important essay.  Yale Kamisar, Equal 
Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, 
from Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 19 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). 
38  Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, supra note 13, at 1290. 
39  We know that current facial recognition software may reflect some of the biases of their 
designers.  For example, we know that facial recognition software designed in China, Japan, and 
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Andrew Ferguson discusses some of this path dependence with respect to 
predictive policing in his contribution to this symposium.40  In the past, I have 
addressed this concern with the hope that racial audits and data trails can do much 
of this work.41  Is that enough?  And as Ric Simmons has asked, how do we ensure 
procedural legitimacy?42  These are not the only questions.  Given the practice in 
many jurisdictions of policing through bench warrants—for everything from 
failing to pay traffic tickets to biking on the sidewalk, for example—how do we 
ensure police do not use access to information about bench warrants pretextually?43  
How do we remain vigilant against the banality of surveillance?  More recently, I 
have worried about the ways we become indoctrinated into assisting the police,44 
which might translate into citizens “voluntarily” embracing the use of chips, Big 
Data, and other new technologies.  Did I mention that Three Square Market 
performed the implants during a “chip party”?45 
But my larger issue, which I end with, is this.  Some years ago, Justice 
Stevens observed that the Court, rather than standing up for individual rights and 
the rights of minorities, had become a “loyal foot soldier” of the police.46  (It is 
telling that the Chief Justice at the time, Rehnquist, had in his youth complained 
                                                                                                                                                      
Korea is better at recognizing East Asian faces than white faces.  At the same time, software designed 
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40  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
503 (2018). 
41  Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, supra note 13, at 1276 n.215 (citing R. A. 
Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1544–50 (2011); Jessica Erickson, Racial Impact 
Statements: Considering the Consequences of Racial Disproportionalities in the Criminal Justice 
System, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1455–56 (2014)). 
42  See Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice: Legitimizing Algorithms in the 
Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2018). 
43  For example, New York City currently has about 1.4 million open warrants for citizens 
stemming from quality of life offenses like walking a dog without a leash and being in a park after 
closing hours.  See How NYC Is Tackling 1.4 Million Open Arrest Warrants for ‘Quality-of-Life’ 
Crimes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 16, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/how-nyc-is-
tackling-1-4-million-open-arrest-warrants-for-quality-of-life-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/UP3H-QU53]. 
44  I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653 
(2018). 
45  Jeff Baenen, Wisconsin Company Holds ‘Chip Party’ to Microchip Workers, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 2, 2017, 7:32 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology/ct-wisconsin-company
-microchips-workers-20170801-story.html [https://perma.cc/453W-8G4E]. 
46  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No impartial 
observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on drugs.  On the contrary, 
decisions like the one the Court makes today will support the conclusion that this Court has become a 
loyal foot soldier in the Executive’s fight against crime.”). 
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that “ivory tower jurisprudence . . . has weakened local law enforcement.”47  
Clearly, under the law-and-order Rehnquist Court, there was a new sheriff/justice 
in town.)  My question is—as scholars and activists, as progressives committed to 
reforming criminal justice, as citizens who want to take Chief Justice Roberts at his 
word when he says “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race”48—how do we enlist the Court in this project 
of “mak[ing] America what America must become”49: “fair, egalitarian, responsive 
to needs of all of its citizens, and truly democratic in all respects, including its 
policing”?50  How do we urge the Court to become a “loyal foot soldier” again, but 
this time for the people?  Instead of technologies that are designed solely with 
policing in mind, how do we enlist the Court in facilitating the deployment of 
technologies that help us?  And how do we impress upon the Court, every time a 
Fourth Amendment issue is decided, the importance of recalling who it is the 
Fourth Amendment protects?  It is there in the opening words: “the people.”51 
                                                                                                                                      
47  See David G. Savage, Rehnquist Wins Confession Battle: Law: For Years, the Chief Justice 
Had Fought Rule That Said Forced Admissions of Guilt Reversed Convictions. His ‘Harmless Error’ 
Standard Now Applies., L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-30/news/
mn-854_1_harmless-error [https://perma.cc/A767-3VBT].  In a 1952 memo Rehnquist wrote as a law 
clerk to Justice Robert Jackson, Rehnquist wrote: “[D]efendants who are as ‘guilty as sin’ should not 
go free simply because of a ‘technical’ mistake by prosecutors or police.  ‘The ivory tower 
jurisprudence . . . has weakened local law enforcement.’”  Id.  He concluded the memo by stating: 
“Let’s hope it [will] come to an end.”  Id. 
48  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
49  JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 10 (Vintage Int’l 1993) (1963) (“[G]reat men have 
done great things here, and will again, and we can make America what America must become.”). 
50  Capers, supra note 29, at 880. 
51  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
